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20 January 1970

NOTE FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT: CIA Input to ACDA (GAC) Questions on
China and the ABM

Whether Dick decides to testify himself (on 30 January), or to have Carl and/or R. J. do so, the Agency should take considerable poetic license in responding to ACDA's inscrutable China questions. Leaving to cooler heads the judgments re how many US casualties, and how much too much is too much, etc., the Agency's legitimate tasks would be something like the following political-technical list:

1. NIE views on Chinese nuclear motivations and behavior, and why the intelligence community so estimates.
2. Probable Chinese foreign policy expectations from political use of its nuclear strength. The likelihood of nuclear blackmail efforts, and what they might look like.
3. The outlook for greater, specifically military motivation and strategic intent in Chinese plans and programs.
4. Briefly, China's strategic capabilities by 1975, 1980, including judgments on Chinese penetration aids.
5. Prospects for China's strategy in a post-Mao situation.
6. Post-Mao Sino-Soviet prospects -- and especially the likelihood that a rapprochement might go so far as seriously to modify an apparently developing triangular, US-Soviet-Chinese, future.



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QUESTIONS CONCERNING CHINA AND THE ABM

1. The agreed NIE judgment (March 1969) is that the actual possession of nuclear weapons is likely to have a sobering effect on Chinese policy, and that China will probably be subjected to the same constraints and complications of policy as the other nuclear powers. Comment.
2. That same NIE states that "for some time" China is likely to value its nuclear capability primarily as a great-power status symbol and for its political effects. Comment. How long is "for some time?"
3. In what manner do US, Soviet, considerations dictate Chinese strategic weapons planning?
4. Over the next decade, what mix of regional and continental strategic weapons capabilities is Peking likely to develop?
5. How important a factor will US ABM progress be in China's policy consideration, over the next decade, as compared with developments re US strategic weapons? The same re ABM agreements reached by the US and the USSR?
6. How likely is Chinese nuclear blackmail -- vis-a-vis Asia, the US, the USSR -- and what forms, specifically, are any such efforts likely to take?
7. What kind of strategic weapons capability are the Chinese Communists likely to have by 1975? 1980?
8. What specific Chinese progress is likely in penetration aids by 1975? 1980?

9. How important a US-Soviet problem will result if the US expands its ABM system to meet growing Chinese capabilities?

10. What steps are the Soviets taking re re-orienting their ABM's against the Chinese? Their strategic missiles? How firm are our data on these questions?

11. What will be the prospects for China's nuclear behavior in a post-Mao situation?

12. Prospects for the Sino-Soviet relationship in a post-Mao situation, and especially the possible effects upon US defenses against strategic attack?

13. How would Chinese conduct be affected in the event that the Japanese should begin to develop a nuclear capability?